home
***
CD-ROM
|
disk
|
FTP
|
other
***
search
/
Shareware Overload Trio 2
/
Shareware Overload Trio Volume 2 (Chestnut CD-ROM).ISO
/
dir33
/
cwru_ct.zip
/
91-5397.ZS
< prev
next >
Wrap
Text File
|
1993-11-06
|
4KB
|
64 lines
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
NEGONSOTT v. SAMUELS, WARDEN, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the tenth circuit
No. 91-5397. Argued January 11, 1993-Decided February 24, 1993
Petitioner Negonsott, a member of the Kickapoo Tribe and a resident of
the Kickapoo reservation in Kansas, was convicted by a County
District Court jury of aggravated battery for shooting another Indian
on the reservation. The court set aside the conviction on the ground
that the Federal Government had exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute
Negonsott for the shooting under the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18
U. S. C. 1153, which encompasses 13 enumerated felonies
committed by ``[a]ny Indian against . . . the person or property of
another Indian or other person . . . within the Indian country.''
However, the State Supreme Court reinstated the conviction, holding
that the Kansas Act, 18 U. S. C. 3243, conferred on Kansas
jurisdiction to prosecute all crimes committed by or against Indians
on Indian reservations in the State. Subsequently, the Federal
District Court dismissed Negonsott's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The Kansas Act explicitly confers jurisdiction on Kansas over all
offenses involving Indians on Indian reservations. Congress has
plenary authority to alter the otherwise exclusive nature of federal
jurisdiction under 1153. Standing alone, the Kansas Act's first
sentence-which confers jurisdiction on Kansas over ``offenses
committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations . . . to the
same extent as its courts have jurisdiction over offenses committed
elsewhere within the State in accordance with the laws of the
State''-is an unambiguous grant of jurisdiction over both major and
minor offenses. And the most logical meaning of the Act's second
sentence-which provides that nothing in the Act shall ``deprive''
federal courts of their ``jurisdiction over offenses defined by the laws
of the United States''-is that federal courts shall retain their
jurisdiction to try all offenses subject to federal jurisdiction, while
Kansas courts shall have jurisdiction to try persons for the same
conduct when it violates state law. This is the only reading of the
Kansas Act that gives effect to every clause and word of the statute,
and it is supported by the Act's legislative history. In contrast, if this
Court were to accept Negonsott's argument that the second sentence
renders federal jurisdiction exclusive whenever the underlying
conduct is punishable under federal law, Kansas would be left with
jurisdiction over only those minor offenses committed by one Indian
against the person or property of another, a result that can hardly be
reconciled with the first sentence's unqualified grant of jurisdiction.
There is no need to resort to the canon of statutory construction that
ambiguities should be resolved in favor of Indians, since the Kansas
Act quite unambiguously confers jurisdiction on the State. Pp. 2-12.
933 F. 2d 818, affirmed.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White,
Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined,
and in all but Part II-B of which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined.